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THE EFFECT OF ENERGY DEPLETION ON ECONOMIC GROWTH
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF ENERGY-ECONOMY INTERACTIONS
The 1970s might well be called the decade of energy. In 1970,
domestic production of oil peaked; natural gas production peaked in 1972.
Both oil and gas output stood lower at the end of the decade than at its
start. During the '70s, OPEC rose to dominance in world energy markets,
coal was again hailed as king but failed to ascend the throne, and nuclear
power generated a critical mass of safety, envirornmental, and ethical
opposition which has brought its development to a virtual standstill.
Depletion of energy resources has emerged as one of the major
problems facing the world for the remainder of the century. At the same
time, the economy of the United States has not fared well. The '70s saw
economic growth falter from the 3.7% per year rate of the '50s and '60s to
2.7% per year. The nation experienced the deepest recession since the
Great Depression, rising unemployment, and the most severe peacetime
inflation in U.S. history. While not all the nation's economic woes can be
traced to energy, the impact of energy on the economic health of the nation
is undeniable. The unemployment, factory shutdowns, and hardship caused by
the OPEC embargo of 1973, natural gas shortages of 1976, coal strike of
1978, and gasoline shortages of 1979 all testify to the direct importance
of energy in maintaining a modern industrial economy. But energy also
affects the economy in more subtle ways: energy prices have outpaced
inflation for most of the decade, adding to inflationary pressures; growing
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capital requirements for energy production threaten investment in other
sectors of the economy; financial markets strain to accomodate
petrodollars; and the dollar falls in value as OPEC prices rise, leading to
still higher prices.
The health of the economy depends critically on energy. Economic
policy can no longer be made without considering its impact on the energy
crisis. Energy policy can no longer be made without regard to its economic
repercussions. Yet there is little agreement on the nature, strength, and
relative importance of the myriad interconnections between energy and the
economy. A framework is needed to integrate in a consistent and realistic
manner the long-term effects of energy depletion and rising energy costs on
investment, economic growth, unemployment, the standard of living, and
inflation.
This paper seeks to demonstrate the feasibility of such an
integrating framework. The framework consists of a system dynamics model
of the national economy (the ENECON model). The purpose, structure, and
assumptions of the model will be described. The relevance of the approach
for policy analysis will be demonstrated by evaluating the impact of energy
depletion on economic activity, investment, and the standard of living. In
particular, the following questions will be addressed:
D-3216 6
o What is the relationship between GNP and energy use?
o Can depletion of energy resources cause or worsen an-economic
downturn?
o How do lags in the substitution process affect economic
performance?.
o Is shortage of capital (financial and physical) likely to
constrain the expansion of energy supplies?
III
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II. THE NEED FOR AN INTEGRATING FRAMEWORK
Since 1973 many energy models have been constructed and numerous
studies have been undertaken to address the energy crisis. In what way
does the ENECON model differ from other energy models? Why is there a need
for an integrating framework to examine interactions between energy and the
economy?
II.1 Common Assumptions of Energy Supply Models:
Because the energy crisis was initially perceived as a supply
problem, early energy models focused primarily on supply and treated the
energy sector in isolation from the rest of the economy.* Table 1 presents
several common assumptions of energy supply models. While these
assumptions simplify analysis of future energy supplies and prices, they
are quite unrealistic:
GNP Growth is Exogenous:
Imagine the effect on GNP of a full embargo of all imported oil
(50% of consumption). Massive unemployment, shutdown of factories,
widespread bankruptcy, and political turmoil would follow, whether the
price system or rationing were used to clear the energy market. It is the
fear of just such an embargo that led to the creation of the Strategic
Petroleum Reserve. Yet in energy supply models GNP would be unaffected.
* An early exception is found in White (1971).
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TABLE 1
COMMON ASSUMPTIONS OF ENERGY SUPPLY MODELS
GNP GROWTH IS EXOGENOUS
CAPITAL COSTS OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES ARE EXOGENOUS
INVESTMENT IN
OTHER SECTORS
ENERGY UNCONSTRAINED BY INVESTMENT NEEDS OF
OF THE ECONOMY
INTEREST RATES ARE EXOGENOUS
INFLATION IS UNAFFECTED BY ENERGY PRICES AND AVAILABILITY
WORLD OIL PRICES ARE UNAFFECTED BY DOMESTIC IMPORT
REQUIREMENTS OR ENERGY POLICIES
Representative models include: PIES, FOSSIL1 and FOSSIL2,
DFI, Livermore Energy Policy Model, Baughman-Joskow, and
Bechtel Energy Supply Planning Model.
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Capital Costs of New Technologies are Exogenous:
The capital costs of technologies such as coal liquefaction and
gasification, shale oil, and nuclear power have risen over the past decade
in real terms, often (as in the case of shale oil) faster than the price of
oil itself! Such behavior is not surprising since these technologies are
extremely energy- and capital-intensive. When energy costs rise, the costs
of producing steel and concrete rise as do the costs of fuel and
feedstocks. Yet these interdependencies are ignored by the supply models.
Investment in Energy Unconstrained by Investment Needs of Other
Sectors of the Economy:
As the economy grows, the "pie" of national output to be divided
among consumption, investment and government spending grows. But because
the pie, though growing, is limited, the increasing capital requirements of
the energy sector can only be satisfied at the expense of investment in
some other sector or at the expense of consumption. The assumption that
GNP is unaffected by the energy sector implies investment in non-energy
sectors and consumption can be maintained in the face of rising energy
sector needs, and therefore that the energy sector cannot increase its
share of the pie. No capital constraints exist in the supply models:
energy industries do not compete for investment against the rest of the
economy. Thus the supply models let the economy have its "pie" and eat it
too.
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Interest Rates are Exogenous:
Growing investment requirements of the energy sector put upward
pressure on interest rates. As interest rates rise, investments earning
only marginal returns will become unprofitable and will be crowded out,
reducing capital investment in other sectors. Energy projects on the edge
of profitability may become unprofitable, requiring government subsidies
for completion.
Inflation is Unaffected by Energy Prices and Availability:
In the supply models inflation is exogenous. Yet energy prices
rose faster than the consumer price index during the '70s, adding to
inflationary pressure. As the price of energy rises, the cost of producing
every good and service in the economy rises (including the costs of
energy production). Higher costs are passed into prices, possibly
triggering a wage-price spiral, reducing the standard of living, and adding
to the demand for credit and to government deficits; each of these adds to
inflationary pressure. Energy projects with long lead times are
particularly vulnerable to inflation. Regulated industries such as
electric utilities are also vulnerable because allowed rates of return are
based on historical costs, not replacement costs.
World Oil Prices are Unaffected by Domestic Import Requirements or
Energy Policies:
Large oil imports worsen the balance of payments and weaken the
dollar; as the dollar drops in value OPEC raises the price of oil to
compensate for the loss in purchasing power, creating a vicious circle of
10
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escalating price hikes and devaluation. If import requirements were
reduced, the vicious circle would be weakened and OPEC's grip on the world
oil market would loosen. Indeed, one major benefit of reduced imports may
be a softening in OPEC prices (DOE, 1979). But the coupling between OPEC
and the domestic energy system is only one-way in the supply models.
Summary:
The assumptions commonly made in energy supply models are not only
contradicted by recent trends but ignore potentially important
interdependencies among energy costs, capital formation, growth, and
inflation. The results of these models are therefore called into question,
and their utility for energy policy-making compromised.
II.2 Characteristics of Energy-Economy Models:
In the past few years, a variety of models have been constructed
to address the deficiencies noted in the supply-oriented models.* These
"energy-economy" models are primarily designed to assess the impact of
energy availability and price on economic growth. The models employ a wide
range of techniques, from linear programming to econometrics to
input/output analysis. However, the models fail to capture important
energy-economy interactions in a manner that recognizes the imperfect
nature of energy markets and the complex dynamics underlying macroeconomic
change. Table 2 lists some of the properties of the major energy-economy
models. These properties are discussed below.
* For a comprehensive summary of research into Energy-Economy interactions
to 1979, see DOE/EIA (1979).
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Table 2
CHARACTERISTICS OF ENERGY-ECONOMY MODELS
EQUILIBRILU ORIENTATION [1] [3] [4] [7]
NO REBALANCING OF FACTORS OR FINAL DEMAND [1] [3] [5] [7]
IMPACT OF THE ECONOMY ON THE ENERGY SECTOR IGNORED [1] [5]
PHYSICAL AND FINANCIAL FLOWS NOT CONSERVED
PRODUCTION INDEPENDENT OF ENERGY
[5] [6]
[5]
[3] [5] [6] [7]
WORKFORCE PARTICIPATION IS EXOGENOUS
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[1] [2] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Elephant-Rabbit, Hogan and Manne (1977)
ETA-MACRO, Manne (1977)
PILOT, Parikh (1976)
Hudson-Jorgenson LITM, Hudson and Jorgenson (1978)
DRI, Hull (1979) and Forrester and Mass (1979)
Wharton Annual Energy Model, WEFA (1978)
Reister-Edmonds Two Sector Model, Reister and Edmonds (1977)
LACK OF ROBUSTNESS
12
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Equilibrium Orientation:
Energy markets have been heavily regulated for decades,
introducing market imperfections by distorting and biasing the information
that normally would cause consumers and firms to respond to the growing
scarcity of energy. Thus, the assumption in many models of a market-
determined equilibrium is not defensible.
Yet even without government-imposed imperfections, the energy
system does not conform to the usual assumptions of equilibrium economics.
The energy system is characterized by extremely long delays. It takes
upwards of 15 years to build a nuclear power plant, 5 to 8 years to build
coal and shale plants, 3 to 5 years to develop offshore oil and gas.
Automobiles last 5 to 10 years. Houses, factories, and offices last 20 to
50 years or more. Modern settlement patterns, transportation networks,
agricultural and industrial techniques, and lifestyles evolved over even
longer periods and will respond only slowly to changes in energy prices and
availability. On the government side, the record of the past few years
demonstrates the existence of substantial delays in developing and
implementing energy policies.
Thus, it will take decades for the economy to fully reconcile
itself to the end of the era of cheap energy. In the interim period, while
adjustments to the new order are incomplete, the impact of high energy
prices may be more severe than in the long run. Models (including
Elephant-Rabbit, PILOT, Hudson-Jorgenson, and Reister-Edmonds) that only
yield an equilibrium snapshot of the economy at some future date are quite
D-3216
limited in their ability to realistically assess the consequences of
delays, capital turnover, and long lead times. The question "where are we
going?" is crucial, but equally so are the questions "can we get there from
here?" and "how long will it take?"
No Rebalancing of Factors or Final Demand
As the price of energy rises relative to prices of other factors
of production and other goods, use of the less expensive inputs will
increase and energy use will be reduced. Firms will substitute labor and
energy-efficient capital for energy-intensive capital. Consumers will
favor products with less energy content over more expensive energy-rich
items. These rebalancing effects may have significant impacts on
unemployment, wages, relative prices, the mix of goods and services
produced, and lifestyles. Models that ignore these effects exclude a
potentially powerful set of forces which may mitigate the effect of higher
energy prices.
Impact of the Economy on the Energy Sector Ignored:
Several of the models (such as the Elephant-Rabbit model) treat
capital and investment in energy production exogenously or have exogenous
energy prices. Yet capital production (primary metals, construction,
shipbuilding, etc.) is an energy-intensive sector of the economy and thus
highly dependent on the price and availability of energy. Further, the
ability of the economy to generate enough capital to satisfy the growing
needs of the energy sector is a key question. By treating capital
exogenously, these models assume away an important economic dimension of
the energy problem.
14
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Physical and Financial Flows not Conserved:
It is extremely important to conserve both physical factors
(capital, labor, energy) and financial flows (wage payments, profits,
taxes) so the full effects of depletion and energy policies are captured.
For example, a government subsidy for production of synthetic fuels must
either raise tax rates, reduce government transfers or expenditures, or
increase the deficit; each of these will have a detrimental impact on the
economy, possibly offsetting the beneficial impact of the subsidy. The
DRI and Wharton models ignore the budgetary implications of energy
policies.
Production Independent of Energy:
In several models, especially econometric models such a the DRI
model, energy is not required for the production of goods. In such a model
a reduction in energy input has no direct effect on output. But as
mentioned above, a full embargo of imported oil would result in widespread
disruptions and a large reduction in output. Models that ignore the
physical dependence of production on energy cannot be used to evaluate the
impact of energy on economic performance.
Lack of Robustness
Many energy-economy models are not robust in the sense that they
behave implausibly under extreme conditions. For examnple, in a recent
application of the DRI model (Hull 1979), the long-run elasticity of oil
demand (based on historical data), was 0.2. Thus, to reduce oil
consumption by 50% (enough to eliminate imports), oil must rise to $800 per
D-3216
barrel. Yet at that price, the annual oil bill would be $2.3 trillion, a
sum larger than GNP in 1979.* A model must behave plausibly outside the
range of historical experience if it is to be useful for policy analysis
since changing conditions and policies may result in previously unobserved
behavior. A model that only makes sense in historical ranges of behavior
can only be used to analyze historical policies.
Workforce Participation is Exogenous:
Labor is a major determinant of GNP. To treat labor input exogen-
ously implies GNP is largely determined without regard to the effects of
energy prices and availability on wages, incomes, unemployment, and life-
style changes which may affect the decision to participate in the work-
force. The energy crisis could foster new low-consumption lifestyles in
which people spend more time working for themselves and less in the
workforce. Models with exogenous labor force participation include the
Elephant-Rabbit, ETA-MACRO, Hudson-Jorgensen, DRI, and Reister-Edmonds.
* Assuming current oil consumption of approximately 16 MMBD at an average
price of $25 per barrel. GNP in 1979 was approximately $2.1 trillion.
16
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Summary:
The models currently available are inadequate representations of
the complex interdependencies between energy and the economy. To assess
the importance of these interactions properly, a model should capture the
feedbacks between the energy sector and the rest of the economy. It should
generate and allocate the productive resources of the economy endogenously
and represent the shifting balance between these resources. Important
delays and disequilibrium effects should be included. Physical and
financial flows must be conserved. It should not rely on exogenous time
series to generate its behavior. Finally, the model should be robust under
extreme conditions. Such a model can then begin to shed light on the
magnitude of the problem, the severity of potential tradeoffs, and the
efficacy of policy initiatives.
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III. STRUCTURE OF THE MODEL
A system dynamics model (the ENECON model) has been constructed
for the analysis. Based on the System Dynamics National Model, the model
is designed to capture the decision-making structure of the economy.* The
model represents a first framework for the analysis of energy-economy
interactions and will undergo further development. The simulations
presented here are intended to illustrate the use of the model and to point
out important areas for future model development. An overview of the model
structure appears in Figure 1. There are five basic sectors: production,
household, financial, government, and OPEC.
The production sector actually consists of three individual
production sectors: one each to produce energy, capital plant and
equipment, and consumer goods and services. A sector represents many
firms, each producing similar types of output. Each production sector has
the same basic or generic structure which constitutes a theory of the firm.
Investment and capacity acquisition, hiring and firing policy, pricing,
production scheduling, and financial management are all represented
explicitly. Though the three producing sectors share a common structure,
each sector is calibrated to represent a particular type of output (such as
consumer goods or energy). For example, the initial ratio of capital to
labor, energy intensity of production, and debt-equity ratio of the sectors
differ to capture their differing production technologies and financial
characteristics.
* For a description of the system dynamics methodology, see Forrester
(1961); for a description of the National Model see Forrester, Mass, and
Ryan (1976).
18
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Figure I OVERVIEW OF MODEL STRUCTURE
D-3216
Each production sector employs three factors of production--labor,
capital, and energy. These inputs are combined through a production
function to yield the output of the sector. Similarly, the household
sector uses four factors to generate "utility" or well-being: labor,
capital (representing housing), consumer goods and services, and energy
(which is necessary to utilize household capital and goods). The three
production sectors and the household interact through orders for output,
shipments, and payments, all of which are represented separately. Figure 2
shows the physical flows of energy, capital, and consumer goods that
connect the production and household sectors.
The energy sector differs from the other sectors in two important
respects. First, energy production depends on non-renewable resources. As
the easily exploited resources are consumed, the productivity of the
energy sector declines. Second, if the energy sector is unable to meet the
total demand for energy, it will attempt to import the difference from the
OPEC sector.
The OPEC sector uses its revenues to purchase current output of
the domestic economy and to invest in the productive assets of the economy,
that is, to purchase claims to future output.
At this stage, the energy sector produces a single type of energy.
There is no distinction between different fuel types. Interfuel substitu-
tion, therefore, is not treated.
20
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Figure 2
THE PRODUCTION AND HOUSEHOLD SECTORS
. . ._ , . ._ _ _ _ . ._ . .
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The financial sector is the source of external financing for
production sectors and the household, and is the repository for savings.
The financial sector allocates available funds for investment among
competing demands for credit, sets interest rates, and balances the
aggregate portfolio of the economy as the relative profitability of the
production sectors changes. For example, if return on investment is higher
than average in a sector, the sector will be able to attract funds for
investment at the expense of other sectors. The financial sector also
includes the Federal Reserve and can influence the money supply through
open market operations.
The government sector sets tax rates, makes transfer payments, and
determines fiscal and monetary policy. Energy policies are also the
province of the government sector.
Table 3 summarizes the major variables in the model, dividing them
into those endogenous to the model, those exogenous, and those that are
outside the scope of the study. The last category is of particular
interest. Energy depletion and the subsequent adjustment of the economy is
a process requiring decades. By comparison, adjustments in inventories of
consumer goods and energy are short-term phenomena and can thus be ignored
without compromising the conclusions of the study. As a result, the model
does not deal with short-term business cycle behavior.* International
trade, except energy imports from OPEC, is excluded for simplicity. While
* Mass (1975) presents a theory of business cycles based on interactions.
between inventory management and employment policies.
22
III
D-3216 23
Table 3
SUMMARY OF MAJOR VARIABLES
ENDOGENOUS
GNP
CONSUMPTION
INVESTMENT
SAVINGS
STANDARD OF LIVING
PRICES (NOMINAL AND REAL)
CONSUMER PRICE INDEX
WAGES (NOMINAL AND REAL)
LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION
EMPLOYMENT
UNEMPLOYMENT
INTEREST RATES
MONEY SUPPLY
DEBT (PRIVATE AND GOVERNMENT)
TAX RATES
ENERGY PRODUCTION
ENERGY DEMAND
ENERGY IMPORTS
ENERGY RESOURCES
EXOGENOUS
POPULATION
OPEC PRODUCTION
REAL OPEC PRICE
D(CLUDE
INVENTORIES
ENVIRONMENTAL
CONSTRAI NTS,
COSTS
NON-ENERGY
RESOURCES'
INTERNATIONAL
TRADE (EXCEPT
WITH OPEC)
DISTRIBUTIONAL
EQUITY
TECHNOLOGICAL
PROGRESS
D-3216
the exchange rate, international capital flows, and terms of trade affect
the economy, they are not of primary importance in assessing the impact of
energy on the economy. The nature of environmental constraints (such as
clean air standards) and possible scarcity of non-energy resources (such as
water for synfuel development) are quite important but, again, for
simplicity have been excluded from the study. Finally, the effect of
rising energy prices on distributional equity is an issue with important
political consequences; though it deserves study, it is beyond the scope of
the research presented here.
The appendix describes the nature and determinants of equilibrium
in the model and reviews initial conditions.
24
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IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
The ultimate goal of developing the framework described above is
policy analysis: the model will be used to evaluate the efficacy and
potential side effects of various energy policies. A necessary prelude to
policy analysis, however, is the identification and exploration of the
channels through which energy influences the economic health of the nation.
The strength of the various relationships must be estimated, and potential
tradeoffs evaluated.
Several simplifying assumptions have been introduced to aid the
investigation. First, the model is initialized to represent an economy in
a stationary equilibrium. Population growth and technological progress
have been excluded. Second, since the focus is on investment, output, and
the standard of living--all real quantities--the money supply is kept
constant, preventing long-run inflation. Third, the tax rate (personal and
corporate) is held constant, and the government is assumed to balance its
budget. Fourth, OPEC is assumed always to satisfy the demand for energy
imports (embargoes and supply interruptions are excluded). OPEC is assumed
to recirculate its revenues by purchasing consumer goods from the domestic
economy. Finally, the real costs of energy production are assumed to
increase smoothly but at an increasing rate as depletion occurs until the
price of a backstop technology is reached.* In the model, the backstop
technology is available in unlimited quantities and without any extra
* Depletion paths and the concept of a backstop technology are discussed
in Nordhaus (1973) and Solow (1974).
D-3216
development or construction delays. Such an assunption will underestimate
the effects of depletion on the economy, especially in the short run.
A caveat must be entered here. The real world does involve a
growing economy, inflation, government deficits, supply interruptions, and
development delays. But the purpose is not to reproduce the actual history
of the economy or predict its future, but to understand how energy
depletion affects the performance of the economy. By setting up a model of
the economy incorporating these assumptions, controlled experiments can be
performed which reveal the impact of depletion alone. As understanding
improves, simplifying assumptions can be relaxed.
In the simulations no attempt has been made to reproduce the
year-by-year performance of the economy. While the initial conditions,
parameters, and configuration of the model correspond to those of the
United States during the post-war period, the nunerical values shown in the
simulation should not be interpreted as predictions or forecasts. Rather,
the initial equilibrium should be used as a point of comparison for
evaluating the simulation results. Subsequent tests should be contrasted
against the reference run discussed below. It is the relative magnitude of
the effects, the overall behavior mode of the economy that is important.
The uncertainty and confusion over the effect of depletion on economic
performance is so great that great precision is unwarranted.
26
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IV. 1 Reference Run
In the first simulation the resource base is assumed equivalent to
about 50 years of consumption at the original usage rate. As depletion
proceeds, the productivity of the energy sector declines, reaching a final
level only one-quarter as great as the original. Thus, the backstop tech-
nology is assumed to be four times more expensive in real terms than the
original cost of the non-renewable resource. Figure 3 shows the returns to
oil drilling activity in the U.S. The return, in barrels per foot drilled,
declined by more than a factor of four up to the late 1960s, indicating the
factor of 4 increase in costs due to depletion assumed in the simulations
is a conservative estimate.
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Figure 3. Returns to oil drilling activity in the U.S.
1860-1967. Source: Hubbert (1969) p. 181.
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The simulation results are presented in Figure 4. Depletion
becomes significant in the 20th year; conversion to the backstop occurs
shortly before the 80th year. Real gross national product declines to
nearly three-quarters of its initial value and then recovers somewhat,
reaching equilibrium after 120 years at only 90% of the initial level. The
consumer price index (CPI) rises steeply in the period of depletion to 130%
of its initial level, then declines from the peak to equilibrium at 120%.
I I I I I ' I
. ,f r I I
RE· f'e
I I I I I I
PRICE
,Iuraw I I I I
U.,
U.,'N9 
a CARS s a
Figure 4. The Reference Run: Real GNP and the Consumer Price Index
as a percent of their initial values; unemployment
as a percent of the workforce.
28
Ill
D-3216 29
Unemployment declines initially but then rises to a peak of more than 15%;
in equilibrium unemployment has returned to the initial 5% rate.
Two aspects of the behavior are notable. First, real GNP is
reduced in equilibrium, indicating a reduction in the material standard of
living. Second, the adjustment to equilibrium required more than half a
century once the backstop was reached. The impact of depletion on GNP,
unemployment, and the price level is much more severe during the adjustment
period than in the final equilibrium.
The essence of depletion is an increase in the effort required to
find, develop, and produce each additional barrel of oil or cubic foot of
gas. The real costs of energy production rise, or equivalently, the
productivity of the energy sector declines. Since the economy has only
limited productive resources at its command, (ultimately a reflection of a
limited supply of labor), a decline in energy sector productivity
necessarily implies a decline in the productivity of the economy as a
whole. The nation becomes poorer.
Figure 5 illustrates the basic relationships between energy
resources, production, investment, and consumption that produce the
behavior in Figure 4. Non-energy production, or GNP, depends on inputs of
energy as well as capital and labor. Given the initial capital stock,
labor force, and energy consumption in the energy sector, energy production
D-3216
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Figure 5. Relationships between energy resources, production,
investment, and consumption.
N.B. The causal loop diagrams presented here are
simplified representations of the actual model structure.
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will fall. As depletion reduces the productivity of the energy sector,
energy production will tend to fall. If investment patterns do not change
and productive resources are not reallocated to energy production, GNP and
consumption will fall as energy production declines. Energy imports do not
provide a way out of the dilemma. If imports are used to make up the
difference between production and demand, the standard of living must still
decline as current output or claims to future output are transferred to
OPEC in payment for oil.
If, on the other hand, capital and labor are diverted into the
energy sector to offset the effect of depletion, GNP and consumption will
decline as these resources are drained from the other sectors of the
economy. In terms of Figure 5, investment in energy will increase at the
expense of investment in the non-energy sectors essential for growth.
Thus, depletion inevitably reduces the material standard of living
below what it would otherwise have been, regardless of how the resources of
the economy are allocated. The question becomes not "does energy affect
economic growth?", but "how strong is the effect?"
Other analysts, especially (Hogan 1978), (Hogan and Manne 1977),
and (Manne 1978) have argued the severity of the impact depends strongly on
the relative importance of energy as an input to production. Since energy
historically accounted for only 5% of the costs of production throughout
the economy, an increase in the energy sector's factor requirements should
have a small effect on the economy. Hogan and Manne liken the energy
31
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sector to a rabbit in an "elephant and rabbit stew": just as adding
another rabbit to the stew will still leave elephant as the dominant
flavor, so an increase in the energy sector's share of the productive
resources of the economy should have a small effect on overall economic
performance. Hogan and Manne go on to argue that given the relative size
of the energy sector, the magnitude of the impact of depletion depends
strongly on the ability of firms and consumers to substitute labor and
energy-efficient capital for energy. If other inputs can easily be
substituted for energy then the impact should be negligible. At the other
extreme, if no substitution is possible, that is, if energy and output move
in lockstep, the impact will be severe. In terms of Figure 5, the relative
size of the energy sector and the potential for substitution determine the
necessary degree of reallocation of resources between energy and non-energy
production. The severity of the tradeoff increases as the ability to
substitute declines.
In the reference run (Figure 4), the long-run elasticity of
substitution between energy and other inputs was assumed to be unity. If
energy accounts for roughly 5% of the costs of production throughout the
economy, (a value consistent with pre-1973 experience), then an elasticity
of one implies a 1% reduction in energy use can be offset with only a .06%
increase in capital and labor, leaving output unchanged. Economnetric
studies have generated widely divergent estimates of the elasticity. Hogan
and Fromholzer (1977) and Hogan and Weyant (1978) report several attempts
to estimate the elasticity; Berndt and Wood (1977) review principal
estimation efforts through 1977. Berndt and Wood (1979) sumnarize the
32
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controversy by noting that the estimates supporting substitutability (an
elasticity near unity) generally derive from cross-sectional data or
engineering process analysis, while estimates supporting complementarity
(an elasticity near zero) generally derive from aggregate time-series data.
The reference run employs an elasticity of unity, representing the high end
of the range; a later simulation (Section IV.2) eliminates substitution of
capital and labor for energy to test the sensitivity of the results to
uncertainty in the value of the elasticity.
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Figure 6 shows the real energy price and energy/GNP ratio from the
base run. The real price of energy rises as depletion occurs, reaching a
maximum 6 times its initial level before dropping back to an equilibrium
almost five times greater. Note that the real price of energy rose by a
factor of five while the productivity of the energy sector declined by only
a factor of four. The extra increase in energy price is due to indirect
factor requirements of the energy sector: as real energy prices rise, real
capital costs also increase, raising the costs of energy production still
further (see below).
As the price of energy rises, substitution efforts reduce the
energy intensity of the economy, and the ratio of energy use to GNP begins
to drop. In equilibrium, the ratio stands at one-fifth of its initial
value, reflecting the unit elasticity of substitution.
According to the Elephant-Rabbit model (Hogan and Manne 1977), an
elasticity of unity implies higher energy costs have virtually no impact on
GNP. Yet the simulation results show a 10% decline in real activity
resulting from a four-fold decline in energy sector productivity. The
explanation for the difference in conclusions lies in the differences
between the structure of the two models. In the Elephant-Rabbit model,
capital and labor are exogenous. Labor, capital, and energy are not
required to produce capital, and energy is not needed to produce energy.
Further, because capital is exogenous, investors are assumed to supply
capital services for production regardless of the rate of return earned on
that capital.
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In the ENECON model, each sector uses labor, capital, and energy
as factors of production. The capital sector needs capital; the energy
sector needs energy. Plant and equipment are required to produce equipment
and erect buildings; energy is used to mine coal, drill for oil, and
especially to convert primary fuels such as oil to electricity. Investors
are assumed to require a target rate of return on their investment and will
raise prices to cover that target return and their operating costs.
In the reference run, the elasticity of substitution in each
sector is one. If capital and labor were exogenous, as in the Elephant-
Rabbit model, the magnitude of the GNP reduction would also be small. But
capital is not exogenous. The desired capital stock in each sector depends
on the cost of capital plant and equipment relative to the costs of labor
and energy. Because energy is required to produce capital, the cost of
plant and equipment rises relative to labor. Unlike the Elephant-Rabbit
model, capital prices rise to cover the higher energy costs and to insure
the target rate of return for investors. As a result, the goods, capital,
energy, and household sectors become relatively less capital intensive and
more labor intensive. Since the labor supply is fixed, the increase in
labor intensity results from a reduction in output beyond the reduction
induced directly by higher energy costs.
In addition, three mutually reinforcing relationships worsen the
impact still further (Figure 7). First, the energy sector requires energy
to produce. With energy five times more expensive, the energy sector cuts
back on its energy use and attempts to substitute even more capital and
III
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labor. Thus, the labor intensity of the energy sector is increased
directly while the increase in capital intensity indirectly raises the
labor requirements of the energy sector by requiring the capital sector to
expand and use more labor. Again, since the labor supply is fixed,
equilibrium output.is reduced even further below the Elephant-Rabbit level.
Second, the capital sector uses capital as a factor of production,
creating another reinforcing relationship. Higher energy costs raise
capital production costs and make capital even more expensive relative to
labor. Thus, the capital sector becomes still more labor intensive,
further reducing equilibrium output.
Finally, the energy sector requires capital to produce and the
capital sector requires energy. As depletion increases the capital
intensity of the energy sector, the indirect energy requirements of the
energy sector also grow. Because energy becomes so much more expensive,
capital becomes less attractive, further increasing the labor intensity of
the energy and capital sectors and reducing equilibrium output. Table 4
shows the changes in output, real prices relative to the real wage, and
factor intensities in each sector caused by depletion in the reference run.
Capital intensity in the economy as a whole increases less than labor
intensity. Capital intensity remains unchanged in the capital sector and
actually declines in the goods sector. In the energy sector, capital
intensity increases only 88% as much as labor intensity.
D-3216
Real Output
Real Price of
Output Relative
to the Real Wage
Capital Intensity
Labor Intensity
Energy Intensity
Table 4. Reference Run: Equilibrium changes in output,
prices, and factor intensities induced by depletion.
N.B. Factor intensity is defined as factor stock
relative to output.
National
Average
Goods
Sector
-7%
7%
-3%
8%
-81%
-10%
10%
2%
11%
-80%
Capital
Sector
-10%
11%
0%
7%
-80%
Energy
Sector
-82%
548%
396%
447%
0%
.
- -
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In summary, the differences in the equilibrium impact of depletion
on GNP between the Elephant-Rabbit and ENECON models are due to two major
factors. First, energy and capital production are exogenous to the
Elephant-Rabbit model; they are endogenous to the ENECON model. The stock
of capital in each sector depends on the cost of capital and the target
rate of return demanded by investors. Since capital production depends on
energy in ENECON, the price of capital rises relative to labor as depletion
raises energy prices. As a result, capital is reduced relative to labor,
reducing equilibrium output. In the Elephant-Rabbit, capital is fixed
regardless of the rate of return earned.
Second, the indirect factor requirements of capital and energy
production are captured in the ENECON model. These reinforcing
relationships magnify the direct impacts of depletion but are not captured
in the Elephant-Rabbit model
Sensitivity analysis was performed to verify the analysis above
and gauge the contribution of the indirect energy and capital requirements
to the reduction in GNP. Table 5 presents the equilibrium GNP from the
reference run compared to the value from runs in which the three
reinforcing feedbacks shown in Figure 7 are broken.
D-3216
Equilibrium real GNP
Simulation Conditions (percent of initial value)
1. Reference Run 90%
2. Energy not required for
energy production 91.6%
3. Capital not required for
energy production 91.4%
4. Capital not required for
capital production 92.5%
5. Energy and capital not required
for energy production; capital
not required for capital production 94.7%
Table 5. Effect of eliminating the indirect
factor requirements of the energy sector.
The dependence of the energy sector on energy accounts for roughly
16% of the impact, while the energy sector's capital needs (which in turn
depend on energy) account for 14%. The capital sector's capital
requirements contribute 25% of the total. When all three reinforcing
40
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relationships are eliminated, the impact of depletion is reduced by nearly
50%.* The remainder of the impact is due to the assumption that capital
intensities adjust to yield the target rate of return for investors.
A second set of sensitivity tests were performed to determine the
effect of the initial capital and labor intensities on the impact of
depletion. Table 6 demonstrates that the equilibrium reduction in real GNP
caused by depletion is not sensitive to the value shares of capital and
labor. Reducing the value share of capital in the goods, capital, and
energy sectors by 66%, 50%, and 33% respectively, adds only two percentage
points to the equilibrium GNP. Increasing the value share of capital has a
correspondingly small effect.
* Due to interactions between the three reinforcing loops, the combined
effect is less than the sum of the individual effects.
D-3216
Value Share of Factors
of Production
Equilibrium
Real GNP
(Percent of
initial value)
1. Reference Run:
Capital Labor
Goods Sector
Capital Sector
Energy Sector
.30
.40
. 60
.675
.565
.250
2. Reduced Capital Intensity:
Capital Labor
Goods Sector
Capital Sector
Energy Sector
.10
. 20
.40
.875
.765
.450
3. Increased Capital Intensity:
Capital Labor
Goods Sector
Capital Sector
Energy Sector
. 40
.50
.70
.575
.465
. 150
90%
Energy
.025
.035
.150
92%
Energy
.025
.035
.150
89%
Energy
.025
.035
.150
Table 6. Sensitivity of final GNP to capital and
labor intensities.
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IV.2 The Importance of Substitution
To test the sensitivity of the results shown in Figures 4-7 to the
substitution potential of the economy, the model was simulated under the
assumption that no substitution of capital and labor for energy is
possible. In Figure 8, energy and output march in lockstep: if energy use
declines 1%, output must decline 1%.
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Figure 8. Fixed energy/GNP ratio: effect of
eliminating substitution for energy.
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Gross national product declines sharply to only 60% of its
original value before recovering, after a century, to 78% of the starting
level. Consumer prices overshoot their final equilibrium, exceeding 160%
of the initial price level for fifteen years. Unemployment also rises
dramatically to almost 25% before returning to normal values after the
120th year. Comparing Figures 4 and 8 reveals that the impact of depletion
is sensitive to the potential for substitution. The difference is most
severe during the adjustment period: in equilibrium, GNP with no
substitution for energy is only 12 percentage points less than in the
reference run and unemployment is the same. In contrast, the depression
created by depletion during the adjustment period reduces GNP by nearly 20
points more than the reference run, boosts unemployment from 15% to nearly
25%, and delays the recovery to equilibrium by nearly two decades.
Because substitution is not possible in the second simulation, the
fraction of national income devoted to energy production rises very sharply
as energy prices rise and a much greater fraction of total investment is
diverted to energy industries. The inflexibility of energy demand forces
the real price of energy up faster and higher than in the base run
(Figure 9). As expenditures for energy rise, the capital sector is less
44
III
45
IO · ·..... ·.. ·I . . . ...... .I . .I .......
I I !
I I I
I I
I I I
I I I I
I I I I ;
' ,,,+ '' REALPRICE:~ ~ ~ ' \ OF ENERGY
' ' / ': _ 
I I I n
I 'r -
I ' /I t
= I I I
I . I I
I XI : a
I t1 AS t 
I I
I . Io_ I I 
O
O
* - 0° YEARS 
Figure 9.
.I . .I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
Zt I
I
I
I
I
Io
III
10
. . . . . . . I
I
I
I
III
. . . . . . .
I
I
4}
I
1
. . . . . . . II
o
oI
.  .~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
.. . . ..;~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
I
Fixed energy/GNP ratio: Real price of energy
(ratio to initial value).
able to expand, thus making capital still less available.* The capital
shortage constrains the expansion of the energy sector, causing a much
larger dependence on energy imports and subsequent loss of GNP as current
output is used to pay for OPEC oil. As in the base run, the mutual
dependency of the capital and energy sectors, their need to bootstrap
themselves and each other to higher levels of activity, triggers a set of
vicious circles that delay the adjustment to depletion and worsen its
impact.
* The assumption of a fixed money supply may affect the magnitude of the
capital shortage in the short run, but since the problem is ultimately a
reduction in the real resources available for investment, the long-run
results would not change significantly were the money supply allowed to
expand. In that case, inflation would be added to the other problems
facing the economy. See Sterman (1980).
D-3216
II
D-3216
A related set of positive feedback loops worsens the problem by
forcing the prices of energy and capital to overshoot their equilibrium
level. Figure 10 shows how depletion can trigger vicious circles causing
increases in the prices of energy and capital: As depletion raises the
price of conventional sources, the energy costs of investments in new
energy technologies rise, raising total energy prices further. Rising
energy prices also raise the production costs and thus the price of capital
plant and equipment, further increasing the costs of energy production.
And as the prices of capital plant and equipment increase, the costs of new
investment in plant and equipment grow as well, adding a third vicious
circle. These positive feedback loops will sustain price increases in
energy and capital and help cause the real price of energy in the second
simulation (Figure 10) to overshoot its equilibrium value by more than 30%.
The price overshoot is more severe in the second run than the base for
without substitution an important set of forces that acted to control the
vicious circles is lost.
The strength of the feedback loops shown in Figure 10 depends on
the energy and capital intensities of energy and capital industries. The
more energy- and capital-intensive these industries are, the stronger the
vicious circles. The dramatic rise in the real costs of technologies such
as coal liquefaction, shale oil, and nuclear power can be traced, in part,
to their massive energy and capital requirements. Figure 10 suggests
energy policies based on these technologies such as a government-sponsored
synfuels program may be self-defeating. By triggering further price
increases in capital and energy, a synfuels program may be plagued by cost
46
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overruns, delays, and reduced profitability. Added government subsidies
would be required to complete the program. In contrast, an energy policy
based on conservation and renewable technologies with relatively low
capital and energy requirements would be less likely to trigger the vicious
circles. By reducing the overall dependence of energy and capital
production on capital and conventional energy, the strength of the vicious
circles will be reduced as well, thus helping to protect the economy from
unexpected increases in energy costs.
IV.3 The Importance of Delays
The second notable aspect of the reference run was the long
adjustment period required before equilibrium is re-established. During
the adjustment period, GNP is reduced below its long-run equilibrium,
consumer prices rise above their final value, and unemployment more than
triples. Indeed, the transient consequences of depletion are much more
important than the equilibrium consequences.
Long delays cause the slow adjustment. There are very long delays
in replacing the original capital plant with energy-efficient capital and
adjusting production technologies to higher energy prices. In addition, as
depletion proceeds, the demand for capital grows, but it takes time for the
capital sector to expand sufficiently to satisfy the extra demand as well
as supply the extra capital it needs for itself. Workforce participation
adjusts slowly to changing wage and employment conditions, a reflection of
the difficult lifestyle changes implicit in the decision to work for
48
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yourself (as a housewife or subsistence farmer, for example) or enter the
workforce (as a factory or farm worker).
The delay in substituting new capital for old is one of the most
important sources of the more severe intermediate-term impact. In the base
run, two decades (the average life of capital) are required to replace old
capital with energy-efficient capital. Thus, even though the price of
energy reaches its equilibrium value by about the 60th year of the simula-
tion, the energy/GNP ratio continues to decline for half a century before
reaching equilibrium (Figure 6). Because of the long life of capital,
energy demand is relatively inelastic in the short run, resulting in a
transient increase in the fraction of national income devoted to energy
production. Figure 11 shows that expenditures on energy as a fraction of
GNP rise in the reference run from nearly 6% to a peak of more than 15%
before settling back to the original level. The fraction of total
investment going to the energy sector more than doubles in the same period.
Expenditures are sustained above normal for a period of 80 years as old
capital is slowly replaced with energy-efficient plant, equipment, and
housing. Thus, the delay in replacing existing capital directly
contributes to the length and severity of the adjustment period by reducing
the discretionary income of households and firms.
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Figure 11. Reference Run: Productive Resources of the economy
are diverted into the energy sector due to delays in
substitution.
The reduction in discretionary income worsens the intermediate-
term impact in yet another way. As productive resources are diverted to
the energy sector, the ability of the economy to purchase needed capital is
depressed. Further, the ability of the capital sector to purchase the
capital it needs is reduced. Reduced investment and availability of
capital delays substitution of energy-efficient capital for old, sustaining
energy consumption and worsening depletion. A vicious circle is started
(Figure 12) in which high energy costs reduce the ability of firms and
households to substitute away from energy, worsening depletion and pushing
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energy costs up still faster. By reducing the resources available to
invest in efficient capital, depletion undermines the very forces acting to
control it, causing a further decline in well-being. The vicious circle
shown in Figure 12 stretches out the adjustment period and causes the price
level, real price of energy, and unemployment to overshoot (and GNP to
undershoot) their long-run values.
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Figure 12. Rising energy prices reduce real income and investment
in energy efficient capital, delay substitution, and
maintain energy demand, causing further price increases.
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Reducing the magnitude of the intermediate-term downturn and
smoothing the transition becomes an extremely important area for energy
policy. To determine the role of the delay in reducing the energy
intensity of production, the model was simulated under the assumption that
energy intensity can be reduced twice as fast as in the base run, or in
half the lifetime of capital. Such an assunption might reflect an
intensive conservation and retrofit program. The long-run elasticity of
substitution is unity, as in the base run. Figure 13 compares GNP and
unemployment in the two runs.
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Figure 13. Effect of reducing delays in improving energy
efficiency on GNP (percent of initial value)
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The final equilibrium is the same, but faster adjustment of energy
intensity to energy prices significantly reduces the undershoot of GNP and
overshoot of unemployment. More rapid conservation lowers the fraction of
resources devoted to the energy sector in the short term, thereby reducing
the strength of the vicious circles that drive output below its long run
value.
D-3216
V. AN EXAMPLE OF ENERGY POLICY ANALYSIS
Energy policy has been hampered by the inability of existing
models to assess the macroeconomic impacts of policy initiatives. The
macroeconomic effects of policies such as price controls, rationing,
subsidies for synthetic fuels, taxes, and import quotas are poorly
understood. Many policies generate forces that oppose or undermine the
intent of the policy. For example, government subsidies for production of
synthetic fuels may increase the supply of oil, but in order to finance the
program the government must either raise taxes, cut spending in other
areas, or increase the deficit. The first two choices benefit the energy
sector at the expense of the rest of the economy; the last contributes to
inflation, thereby reducing the real value of the subsidy and causing a
need for even higher subsidies.
A tax on energy use with a fully compensating income tax reduction
was chosen to demonstrate the ability of the ENECON model to evaluate
energy policies in the context of the economy as a whole.
A tax on energy use directly affects incentives for energy con-
sumption and production; rebating the proceeds by reducing tax rates
creates incentives in other sectors of the economy to rebalance the mix of
productive factors and the composition of final demand. Thus, such a tax
provides a good test of the model's ability to capture important macro-
economic and social feedbacks.
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The tax proposal tested in the model consists of a fixed BTU
surcharge on energy use matched by a reduction in both corporate and
personal income tax rates sufficient to offset the revenues generated by
the tax. Thus, government revenues are initially unchanged. The reduced
income tax rates allow consumers to purchase the same market basket of
goods as before the tax, though, of course, it is to their advantage to use
less energy-intensive items. Similarly, firms will be able to achieve
roughly the same after-tax return on investment despite higher unit costs.
If large enough, the tax would create strong incentives to reduce energy
use and increase use of other factors, particularly labor.
Several simplifying assumptions have been made in representing the
tax. First, it is imposed in one step, while a phased introduction would
probably be required in reality. Second, income tax rates are held
constant at the new, lower level; as energy use (hence tax revenues)
declines, government spending is assumed to drop correspondingly. Third,
the tax is levied on all energy; in reality only oil and gas would be
taxed, thus stimulating production of coal and renewable alternatives.
The initial conditions are the same as those used to produce the
reference run. In the 40th year of the simulation, a BTU tax sufficient to
cut both personal and corporate income tax rates by 20% is imposed. The
result, shown in Figure 14, is a transient reduction in GNP and increase in
unemployment relative to the base case followed by a long-term adjustment
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Figure 14. Effect on GNP and employment of an energy tax with
compensating reduction in income taxes (GNP as a
percent of initial value; unemployment as a percent of
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to an equilibrium GNP some 10% higher than the base. In equilibrium, real
GNP is restored to its original level. The long-run effect of the tax is
to increase real GNP (and consumption) by reducing energy demand,
increasing capital intensity, and increasing workforce participation. The
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reduction in energy demand frees labor and capital from the least produc-
tive sector for use in other sectors. Capital intensity increases
becausethe after-tax cost of capital services is reduced. Workforce
participation increases because the after-tax wage has increased;
employment increases because labor becomes relatively less expensive than
energy.
The cause of the transient reduction in GNP lies in the pricing
policies of the production sectors. In the model, prices are determined by
both unit costs and a traditional profit margin or markup on unit costs,
along with supply and demand pressures. Even though reducing the corporate
tax rate allows the same after-tax return on investment despite higher unit
costs, it will take time for managers to become accustomed to the lower
markup required to achieve the target after-tax return. Before the
adjustment to a new markup level is made, prices are pushed above their
long-run equilibrium level, reducing real income, aggregate demand, and
employment.
The effect of traditional rules of thumb for markup on prices and
GNP illustrates the importance of capturing managerial decision making in a
model. By including a representation of the price setting process that
does not rely on equilibrium assumptions, a potential source of managerial
resistance to the policy initiative has been identified. The tax policy
can then be improved by designing ways to overcome such institutional
resistance.
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The effect of the tax policy on GNP under the assumption of a
speedy adjustment to the new markup levels is shown in Figure 15. Here
the long-run benefit is the same, but the transient decline in GNP below
the reference run is eliminated and the transient increase in unemployment
is substantially reduced.
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Figure 15. Effect of energy tax with compensating income tax
reduction and swift adjustment of profit margins.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The simulations presented above reveal several important results.
Energy depletion does have a significant effect on GNP, consumption, and
employment. Even though the energy sector is a small part of the economy,
depletion can significantly reduce economic growth. The impact of
depletion is particularly severe in the intermediate term, before the
economy can fully adjust to higher energy prices. During the adjustment
period, depletion can dramatically reduce national output and create
massive unemployment.
By diverting resources to the energy sector, depletion reduces
non-energy output. The indirect requirements of the energy sector,
particularly the higher level of capital required, worsen the impact since
labor and capital must be diverted to produce more capital for use in the
energy sector. The capital and energy requirements of the capital and
energy sectors further reinforce the indirect effects.
The greater the potential for substitution, the milder the impact
of depletion on GNP. If substitution is difficult, the demand for energy
will be very inelastic; a much larger fraction of GNP must then be devoted
to energy production and capital production for the energy sector. But
while the potential for substituting labor and capital for energy
influences the long-run level of output somewhat, the intermediate-term
impact of depletion is particularly sensitive to the substitution
potential. The surge in demand for capital during the adjustment period
D-3216
can create a capital shortage and constrain the ability of the capital
sector to increase its own capacity, aggravating the shortage further.
Long delays in capital turnover cause expenditures on energy and
investment in energy to rise more in the short run than in the long run.
The diversion of extra resources to the energy sector reduces GNP and the
standard of living below their long-run values during the period of
adjustment. Thus the disequilibrium effects of depletion are quite
significant.
Speeding conservation efforts can substantially smooth the tran-
sition and reduce the undershoot of GNP by reducing the fraction of GNP
devoted to energy and weakening the vicious circles that reduce the ability
of firms and consumers to cope with higher prices.
The results presented here illustrate the importance for energy
policy of the interactions between energy depletion and macroeconomic
behavior. Though the results are preliminary, several important areas of
concern have been identified, and the feasibility of an integrating
framework for energy-economy analysis has been demonstrated. Future model
development will address the simplifying assumptions made in the
simulations; future policy analysis will integrate the results above with
results on inflation, monetary and fiscal policy, and other energy policy
initiatives.
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APPENDIX
EQUILIBRIUM STRUCTURE OF THE ENECON MODEL
The ENECON model is a dynamic model. The model is designed
to reflect actual managerial and personal decision-making by firms and
households. In reality, information about the future is not available
for current decision making. Indeed, information about the current
state of affairs is often unavailable. Important perception delays
exist; expectations are often wrong; goals are often unrealized;
conflicting pressures may arise, forcing compromise.
Thus, in the model, information about the future is not used
in current decisions. Perception delays are included where
significant, for example in estimating the "true" demand for a
product, factor availability, consumer incomes, and the relative
productivity of different factors of production. Expectations are
formed in the model on the basis of past behavior and trends; there is
a delay in forming expectations since it takes time to separate an
underlying trend from noise and short-term fluctuations. Goals, such
as the desired capital stock or desired energy intensity of
production, cannot be realized instantly: capital must be ordered,
built, and delivered; old, energy-intensive capital must depreciate
before it can be replaced with energy-efficient capital (except for
retrofits). Conflicting pressures may delay or prevent a goal from
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being reached. For example, higher energy prices may increase desired
capital or desired labor; at the same time, higher costs may create a
cash crunch preventing firms and consumers from ordering as much
capital or hiring as many people as they need.
Because the model captures the important pressures and delays
that characterize the real economy, there is no guarantee that the
simulated system will be in equilibrium at any given time. Indeed,
the simulations above indicate the disequilibrium behavior of the
economy is extremely important for energy analysis and policy.
However, if undisturbed, the system will eventually reach a stable
equilibrium.
Equilibrium in the context of the simulations presented above
means desired states and actual states are equal. Further, since
secular growth has been excluded, all state variables will be constant
in equilibrium. For example, investment will just balance
depreciation, income will equal expenditures, net saving will be zero,
and net borrowing will equal net debt retirement plus defaults;
desired factor stocks and actual factor stocks will be equal, money
balances will equal their desired levels, and return on investment
will equal the required rate of return.
The description below presents an overview of the conditions
that determine equilibrium in the model and is not intended to be
complete documentation of either the equilibrium conditions or the
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dynamic structure of the model. Full documentation will be available
at the completion of the work described here.
The equilibrium reached by the model conforms to neoclassical
theory. Producers are assumed to be profit-maximizers; consumers are
assumed to be utility-maximizers. The equilibrium conditions fall
into two broad categories: those that determine the real equilibrium
and those that determine the price level. The work reported here
focuses on the real effects of depletion; for a description of the
determinants of the price level, see Sterman (1980).
The determinants of the real equilibrium fall into three
classes: first, conditions that determine the optimal mix of factors
of production within each sector; second, conditions that determine
the return on investment and price of output in each sector; and
third, conditions that balance the demand for factors with the supply
throughout the economy. The three sets of conditions are described
more fully below.
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A.1 Factor Balance Within Each Sector
The heart of each production sector is a neoclassical
production function (the household employs an analogous utility
function). In equilibrium the marginal revenue product of each factor
equals its marginal cost:
(1) MRs*MPf,s/MCf,s 1 all f,s
(2) MRs = Ps
(3) MCfs Pf for f = labor, energy
(4) MCfs Pf CCRs for f = capital
where,
MRs = Marginal Revenue in sector ($/output unit)
MPf s = Marginal Productivity of factor in sector
(output units/year/factor unit)
MC = Marginal Cost of factor in sectorf,s
($/year/factor unit)
P = Price of output in sector ($/output unit)
s
Pf = Price of factor ($/factor unit)
CCR = Capital Charge Rate (%/year)
f = index of factors of production
s = index of production sectors
Both output and factor markets are assumed to be competitive,
thus marginal revenue equals the current price of output and the
marginal cost of a factor equals its current price. The assumption of
competitive output and factor markets does not imply these markets are
--- --'---~-"I-^-I"------s^l--
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always in equilibrium or that, for example, the wage always equals the
marginal revenue product of labor. Instead, competition here reflects
the assumption that each firm in a sector perceives itself to be small
relative to the sector as a whole and unable to influence factor or
output prices.
In the simulations presented above, a standard Cobb-Douglas
production function with constant returns to scale was used.
Cobb-Douglas functions with constant returns to scale have an
elasticity of substitution of unity between factors.*
In the energy sector the production function is modified by
a term representing the impact of depletion. The isoquants of the
energy sector's production function shift downward as resources are
depleted:
(5) Qe = D*Q(K eLe'Ee)
(6) D = D(Resources)
* In the simulation with no substitution of capital and labor for
energy (Section IV.2; Figures 10-12) the energy intensity of
production in each sector was fixed at its initial level throughout
the simulation preventing the rising price of energy from reducing
energy intensity. Thus, the energy/output ratio in each sector
remained constant, implying no substitution of capital or labor for
energy was possible.
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where
Qe = energy production (BTU/year)
Q(K,L,E) = energy sector production function
D(resources) = depletion function (dimensionless)
Depletion is assumed to be Hicks-neutral; the depletion function is
monotonic and reaches an asymptote at the backstop level.
A Cobb-Douglas utility function is used in the household
sector. The optimal factor mix is determined by the following
conditions:
(7) MVUh*MUf,h/MCfh = 1
TF
(8) MVUh [ F *MC ]/Ufh h f,h hf=1
where
MVUh = Marginal Value of Utility ($/utility unit)
MUf h = Marginal Utility of factor in household
(utility units/year/factor unit)
MCf h = Marginal Cost of factor in household ($/factor unit)
U = Utility (utility units/year)
F = Factor of utility (factor units)
h = household sector
f = index of factors of utility
TF = Total Factors of utility
The household adjusts its factor mix until the marginal
dollar value of the utility contributed by the factor equals its
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marginal cost. The marginal dollar value of a unit of utility is the
total cost of the current level of utility at the margin divided by
the current level of utility. These conditions ensure that in
equilibrium the household employs the optimal mix of factors of
utility. Given the optimal mix, the equilibrium stock of each factor
is determined by the income of the household: in equilibrium, the
cost of maintaining the stocks of factors will just exhaust household
disposable income, insuring that utility is maximized.*
A.2 Return on Investment and Price
It is assumed throughout that investors require a certain
after-tax return on investment. The target return includes the real
interest rate plus a risk premium to compensate investors for
undertaking the investment. In equilibrium, the net income of the
production sectors must yield the target return to all investors.
Ignoring taxes, investment tax credits, and debt for simplicity:**
(9) GROI = NIs/MVCs
(10) NIs PsQs(Ws*Ls+Pe*ES+Pk*Ks/ALCS)
(11) MVCs = PkKs
* Since the model reaches a stationary equilibrium involving no
growth, equilibrium net savings equals net investment equals zero.
Therefore, the entire disposable income of the household is spent on
consumption.
** Though taxes, investment tax credits, and debt are included in the
model.
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where
GROI = Goal for Return on Investment (%/year)
NI = Net Income ($/year)
MVC = Market Value of Capital ($)
P = Price of output ($/unit)
Q = Quantity of output sold (units/year)
L = Labor force (persons)
W = Wage ($/person-year)
E = Energy consumption (BTU/year)
Pe = Price of Energy ($/BTU)
-Pk = Price of capital ($/capital unit)
K = Capital Stock (capital units)
ALC = Average Life of Capital (years)
The equilibrium condition for price is simply a restatement
of the condition for return on investment. In equilibrium, prices
just cover the costs of production and normal profit (determined by
the target return on investment and including depreciation). Again,
ignoring debt, taxes, and investment tax credits:
(12) P = UC + PM
s s s
(13) UCs = (Ws*Ls + Pe Es)/QS
(14) PMs = [(GROIS *MVCs) + DEPs]/Qs
(15) DEPs = PkKs/ALCs
where
P = Price ($/unit)
UC = Unit Costs ($/unit)
PM = Profit Margin ($/unit)
DEP= Depreciation ($/year)
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In the short run, imbalances between supply and demand can
raise or lower price above the equilibrium level. But supply/demand
imbalances cannot exist in equilibrium (unless price controls or other
market distortions are introduced). For example, higher than
equilibrium prices will depress demand and induce higher profits and
hence entry of firms into the sector, increasing supply and forcing
price down to the equilibrium level. Lower than equilibrium prices
will result in exit of firms, reduced supply, and a restoration of
equilibrium.
Wage determination differs from other factor prices. Each
sector generates its own wage, and competes for labor against the
other sectors. Five factors influence the level of wages in each
sector: return on investment in each production sector relative to
the target return, liquidity in each sector, the relative availability
of labor in each sector, wages in other sectors, and the perceived
rate of inflation in consumer prices. In equilibrium, ROI will equal
its target value, liquidity will be normal, labor availability will be
normal, wages in all sectors will be equal, and consumer prices will
be stable. Imbalances in the relative availability of labor or in the
relative wage will cause wages to adjust, employment to change, labor
to migrate between sectors, and workforce participation to vary until
the imbalance is eliminated. The equilibrium wage will equal the
marginal revenue product of labor.
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A.3 Supply and Demand Balance throughout the Economy
The equilibrium conditions described above ensure that each
sector chooses the optimal mix of factors and earns an adequate
return. The conditions described below determine the overall level of
output and the general equilibrium for the economy.
First, the total consumption of each type of output must
equal production:
(16) Energy: Qe Eg+Ek+Ee+Eh
(17) Capital: Qk K /ALCg + Kk/ALCk + Ke/ALCe + Kh/ALCh
(18) Goods: Qg Gh/ALGh
where
Q = production (output units/year)
E = energy consumption (BTU/year)
K = capital stock (capital units)
ALC = average life of capital (years)
G = goods stock (goods units)
ALG = average life of goods (years)
e,g,k,h = energy, goods, capital, household sectors
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Second, household expenditures must equal income. Ignoring
taxes and debt, the household spends money on goods, capital, and
energy; it receives wages and profits from the production sector as
income:
(19) PgGh/ALGh + PkKh/ALCh + PeEh = W(Lg+Lk+Le) + PkGROI(Kg+Kk+Ke)
Finally, the sum of the labor employed in the production
sectors and the labor "employed" in the household must equal the total
working age population Lt:
(20) Lt = Lg+Lk+Le+Lh
Together, the three sets of equilibrium conditions determine
the real equilibrium of the simulated economy. The equilibrium
reached is a general equilibrium since all markets are simultaneously
clearing and there are no exogenous factor or output prices. Only the
total working-age population is given; the allocation of labor among
the different sectors and the various production rates are endogenous.
A.4 Initial Conditions and Parameters
The model has been initialized to correspond to economic
conditions in the post-war era and before the energy price increases
of the 1970s. The year 1950 was chosen as a reference year for GNP
and energy production. Since the purpose of the model is policy
analysis and not prediction, econometric estimation has not been
performed at the current stage of development. Parameters and initial
D-3216
conditions were chosen to be consistent with aggregate data and
economic theory; sensitivity analysis was performed to test the
importance of errors in parameter choice (see Sections IV.1, IV.2, and
IV. 3).
Table 7 presents some of the more important parameters and
initial conditions. Where applicable, actual values for 1950 are also
given.
Variables
GNP2
Energy Production
Population
Unemployment
Real Interest Rate
Target after-tax ROI
Capital Charge Rate
Raw Corporate Tax Rate
Average Personal
Income Tax
Average Life of Capital
Average Life of Goods
Model Value1
$254 billion 3
33.4 quads/year
151 million
5%
4%/year
8.5%/year
19%/year
50%
1950 Value
$285 billion4
33.6 quads/year5
151 million 6
5.1% 7
30%
20 years
2 years
NOTES
1. Model values refer to the reference run.
2. 1950 dollars
3. The model is initialized for a stationary equilibrium. Since the
real economy was growing, model-generated investment (and GNP) are
less than the actual values.
4. Dept. of Commerce (1975) p. 224
5. DOE/EIA (1978) p. 7
6. Dept. of Commerce (1975) p. 8
7. Ibid., p. 127
Table 7. Selected Initial Conditions and Parameter Values
I ____I_____
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The value shares of each factor of production (the exponents
in the Cobb-Douglas production functions) are presented in Table 8.
The exponents for capital and labor were chosen to reflect the
assumption that the energy sector is more capital intensive than the
capital sector which, in turn, is more capital intensive than the
goods sector.
Capital Labor Energy Goods
Goods Sector .30 .675 .025 0
Capital Sector .40 .565 .035 0
Energy Sector .60 .250 .150 0
Household
Sector .13 .200 .020 .65
Table 8. Value shares of factors of production
The exponents for energy were chosen to be consistent with
energy production in the reference year. The exponents are quite
small in the household, goods, and capital sectors, reflecting the
small contribution of energy to production in the 1950s. The large
exponent for energy in the energy sector requires some explanation.
With a Cobb-Douglas production function, the equilibrium condition for
energy use in the energy sector (equation 1) becomes:
D-3216
(1') PeQeee/PeEe = 1
where Pe = Price of energy
Qe = Energy production
Ee = Energy consumption in the energy sector
ee = Exponent for energy in the energy sector
Solving for ee yields:
(11") ee = Ee /Qe
In 1950, 5.0 quads/year out of the gross energy production of
33.6 quads/year were consumed in the generation of electricity
(DOE/EIA 1978, p. 7). Thus, the value for ee becomes:
ee = Ee/Qe = 5.0/33.6 = .15
This is probably low since it ignores energy consumed in other forms
of energy production such as oil exploration, refining, and
distribution; coal mining; and electricity transmission and
distribution losses.
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